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INTRODUCTION
As a starting point for our discussion on the dynamics of logic we quote G. Birkhoff and J. von Neumann, confronting the then ongoing tendencies towards intuitionistic logic with their observation of the "logical" structure encoded in the lattice of closed subspaces of a Hilbert space, the "semantics" of quantum theory (Birkhoff and von Neumann 1936) :
"The models for propositional calculi [of physically significant statements in quantum mechanics] are also interesting from the standpoint of pure logic. Their nature is determined by quasiphysical and technical reasoning, different from the introspective and philosophical considerations which have to guide logicians hitherto [ ... ] whereas logicians have usually assumed that [the orthocomplementation] properties L71-L73 of negation were the ones least able to withstand a critical analysis, the study of mechanics points to the distributive identities L6 as the weakest link in the algebra of logic." (p.839) They point at a fundamental difference between Heyting algebras (the semantics of intuitionistic propositional logic) and orthomodular lattices (the "usual" semantics of quantum logic) when viewed as generalizations of Boolean algebra (the semantics of classical propositional logic). Operational quantum logic (see below) provides a way of blending these seemingly contradicting directions in which logic propagated during the previous century (Coecke (nd)a) . In this paper we focus on two new logical structures, namely (intuitionistic) linear logic (Girard 1987 , Abrusci 1990 ) which emerged from the traditional branch of logic, and dynamic operational quantum logic (Coecke (nd)b, Coecke et al (nd)c, Smets 2001), emerging from the above mentioned blend. We also briefly consider the "General Dynamic Logic" proposed in van Benthem (1994) . Concretely we start in section 2 with an outline of static operational quantum logic. In section 3 we survey dynamic operational quantum logic, and demonstrate that the emerging structures do not fit in the logical system proposed in van Benthem (1994) . In section 4 we compare dynamic operational quantum logic with linear logic while we focus on formal and methodological differences.
STATIC OPERATIONAL QUANTUM LOGIC
The Geneva School approach to the logical foundations of physics originated with the work in Jauch and Piron (1963) , Piron (1964) , Jauch (1968) , Jauch and Piron (1969) , Piron (1976) and Aerts (1981) as an incarnation of the part of the research domain "foundations of physics" that is nowadays called "Operational quantum logic" (OQL)
1 -see for a recent overview of general OQL. More concretely, OQL as a theory aims to characterize physical systems, ranging from classical to quantum, by means of their actual and potential properties, in particular by taking an ontological rather than an empirical perspective, but, still providing a truly operational alternative to the standard approaches on the logical status of quantum theory.
Since Moore (1999) , Coecke et al ((nd)a,b) and Smets (2001) provide recent and detailed discussions of OQL, we intend in this paper to give only a concise overview, focusing on its basic concepts and underlying epistemology.
First we want to clarify that the operationalism which forms the core of OQL points to a pragmatic attitude and not to any specific doctrine one can encounter in last century's philosophy of science (Coecke et al (nd)a). Linked to the fact that we defend the position of critical scientific realism in relation of OQL, operationality points to the underlying assumption that with every property of a physical system we can associate experimental procedures that can be performed on the system, each such experimental procedure including the specification of a well-defined positive result for which certainty is exactly guaranteed by the corresponding property. While on the epistemological level our knowledge of what exists is based on what we could measure or observe, on the ontological level physical properties have an extension in reality and are not reducible to sets of procedures. Focusing on the stance of critical scientific realism, we first adopt an ontological realistic position and a correspondence theory of truth. Though, contrary to naive realists we do adopt the thesis of fallibilism by which truth in relation to scientific theories has to be pursued but can only be approached. As such we agree with Niiniluoto (1999) that scientific progress can be characterized in terms of increasing truthlikeness. Furthermore, we believe that reality can indeed be captured in conceptual frameworks, though contrary to Niiniluoto we like to link this position to a "weak" form of conceptual idealism. Concentrating for instance on Rescher's conceptual idealism as presented in Rescher (1973 Rescher ( , 1987 and revised in Rescher (1995 §8) , this position maintains that a description of physical reality involves reference to mental operations, it doesn't deny ontological realism and also adopts the thesis of fallibilism. This position is opposed to an ontological idealism in which the mind produces the "real" objects. As one might expect, we want to stress that we are not inclined to adopt Rescher's strict Kantian distinction between reality out there and reality as we perceive it, though we are attracted by the idea of capturing ontological reality in mind-correlative conceptual frameworks. Once we succeed in giving such a description of reality, it approaches according to us the ontological world close enough to omit a Kantian distinction between the realms of noumena and phenomena. Why it is of importance for us to reconcile critical realism with a weak form of conceptual idealism becomes clear when we focus on OQL. Firstly, we cannot escape the fact that in our theory we focus on parts of reality considered as well-defined and distinct which we can then characterize as physical systems. Secondly we have to identify the properties of those systems which is a mind-involving activity. To be more explicit, a physicist can believe that a system ontologically has specific actual and potential properties, but to give the right characterization of the physical system he has to consider the definite experimental projects which can test those properties so that, depending on the results he would obtain, he can be reinforced in his beliefs or has to revise them. How OQL formally is built up, using the notions of actual properties, potential properties and definite experimental projects, will be clarified below. To recapitulate we finish this paragraph by stressing that we focus in our scientific activity on parts of the external world, reality is mind-independent, though the process of its description "involves" some mind-dependent characterizations.
Let us introduce the primitive concrete notions on which OQL relies, explicitly following Coecke et al ((nd)a):
• We take a particular physical system to be a part of the ostensively external world which is considered as distinct from its surroundings;
• A singular realization of the given particular physical system is a conceivable manner of being of that system within a circumscribed experiental context;
• States E ∈ Σ of a given particular physical system are construed as abstract names encoding its possible singular realizations;
• A definite experimental project α ∈ Q on the given particular physical system is a real experimental procedure which may be effectuated on that system where we have defined in advance what would be the positive response should it be performed.
• Properties a ∈ L of a given particular physical system are construed as candidate elements of reality corresponding to the definite experimental projects defined for that system. We as such obtain a mapping of definite experimental projects Q on properties L .
The notion of an element of reality was first introduced in Einstein et al (1935) as follows:
"If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty [...] the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity" (p.777).
While this formulation is explicitly the starting point for Piron's early work, we insist that Piron's operational concept of element of reality is both more precise and allows theoretical deduction, being based on an empirically accessible notion of counterfactual performance rather than a metaphorical notion of non-perturbation.
It will become clear that a property can be actual or potential depending on the state in which we consider the particular physical system. Similarly we can say that certainty of obtaining a positive answer when performing a definite experimental project depends on the state of the system. In order to construct our theory further we need to introduce the following relationship between definite experimental projects, states and properties:
• A definite experimental project α is called certain for a given singular realization of the given particular physical system if it is sure that the positive response would be obtained should α be effectuated;
• A property a is called actual for a given state if any, and so all, of the definite experimental projects corresponding to the property a are certain for any, and so all, of the singular realizations encoded by that state. A property is called potential when it is not actual.
Given the above notions, it becomes possible to introduce an operation on the collection Q of definite experimental projects. What we have in mind is the product of a family of definite experimental projects ΠA which obtains its operational meaning in the following way:
• The product ΠA of a family A of definite experimental projects is the definite experimental project "choose arbitrarily one α in A and effectuate it and attribute the obtained answer to ΠA ".
More explicitly, given a particular realization of the system, ΠA is a certain definite experimental project if and only if each member of A is a certain definite experimental project. Formally it becomes possible to pre-order definite experimental projects by means of their certainty:
• α ≺ β := β is certain whenever α is certain.
The notions of a trivial definite experimental project, which is always certain and an absurd definite experimental project, which is never certain, can be introduced and play the role of respectively maximal and minimal element of the collection Q. The trivial and absurd definite experimental projects give rise on the level of properties to a trivial and absurd property, the first is always actual while the latter is always potential. Through the correspondence between definite experimental projects and properties, the mentioned pre-order relation induces a partial order relation on L :
• a ≤ b := b is actual whenever a is actual.
The product of a collection of definite experimental projects with corresponding collection of properties A provides a greatest lower bound or meet for any A ⊆ L , and as such the set of properties L forms a complete lattice. Indeed, once we have the "meet" of any collection of properties, we can construct the operation of "join" or least upper bound via Birkhoff's theorem stating that for a given A ⊆ L:
Note however that contrary to the meet, the join admits of no direct operational meaning in OQL. Even more, we see that the join of a collection of properties need not, and generically does not, correspond to a classical disjunction since the following implication is only secured in one direction,
With respect to the meet we do have
following directly from the identification of the meet with the product of definite experimental projects.
The property lattice description of a physical system in OQL allows a dual description by means of the system's states (Moore 1995 (Moore , 1999 in terms maximal state sets µ(a) ⊆ Σ for which a common property a ∈ L is actual whenever the system is in a state in E ∈ µ(a) , these sets being ordered by inclusion. More explicitly, the state-property duality may be straightforwardly characterized once we introduce the forcing relation ⊲ defined by E ⊲ a if and only if the property a is actual in the state E, by the fact that we can associate to each property a the set µ(a) = {E ∈ Σ | E ⊲ a} of states in which it is actual, and to each state E the set S(E) = {a ∈ L | E ⊲ a} of its actual properties. Formally µ : L → P (Σ) : a → µ(a) is injective, satisfies the condition µ( A) = µ[A] and is called the Cartan map. In particular we now see that actuality can be studied at the level of either states or properties since we have E ∈ µ(a) ⇔ E ⊲ a ⇔ a ∈ S(E). We will be a bit more explicit about the dual description of a physical system by means of its states and operationally motivate the introduction of a symmetric and antireflexive orthogonality relation on the set Σ:
• Two states E and E ′ are called orthogonal, written E ⊥ E ′ , if there exists a definite experimental project which is certain for the first and impossible for the second.
If we equip Σ with ⊥, we can consider L Σ as the set of biorthogonal subsets, i.e., those A ⊆ Σ with
Whenever ⊥ is separating (Coecke et al (nd)a), the codomain restriction of the Cartan map µ to the set of biorthogonals gives us an isomorphism of complete atomistic orthocomplemented lattices (see below) extending the dual description of a physical system by its state space Σ and its property lattice L -for details we refer to Moore (1999) and Coecke et al ((nd)a). It thus follows that L Σ is an atomistic lattice where the singletons {E} = {E} ⊥⊥ are the atoms. Let us first introduce the notion of an atomistic lattice more explicitly:
• A complete lattice L is called atomistic if each element a ∈ L is generated by its subordinate atoms, a = {p ∈ Σ L | p ≤ a} , where the p ∈ Σ L are by definition the minimal nonzero elements of L .
Under the assumption that states are in bijective correspondence with atoms, Σ = Σ L ⊆ L , each property lattice is atomistic in the sense that
for each a ∈ L . Note that S(E) is the strongest actual property of the collection S(E) which as such "represents" the state.
While we will only work with complete atomistic lattices in the following, we want to finish off this section with an example explaining that a property lattice description for a quantum system will not lead to a boolean algebra. Under the assumption that properties have opposite properties and even more that each property a ∈ L is the opposite of another one, we can formally introduce an orthocomplementation, i.e.:
A lattice equipped with an orthocomplementation is usually abbreviated as an ortholattice.
Consider now the property lattice description of a photon as presented in Piron (1978) . Take as a physical system a photon which is linear polarized and moves on a line. A definite experimental project α φ is then defined by:
• i. The apparatus: A polarizer oriented with angle φ and a counter placed behind it; ii. The manual: Place the polarizer and counter within the passage of the photon; iii. If one registers the passage of the photon through the polarizer, the result is "yes" and otherwise "no". Clearly, a property a corresponding to α φ is called actual if it is certain that α φ would lead to the response "yes", should we perform the experiment. In the diagram (Fig 1) of this photon, we consider some of its properties explicitly: a corresponds to α φ , b to α ′ φ , a ′ to α φ + π\2 and b ′ to α ′ φ + π\2. One immediately sees that this lattice is not boolean since distributivity is violated in the sense that a
DYNAMIC OPERATIONAL QUANTUM LOGIC
Contrary to the static approach outlined above we will now analyze how an actual property before alteration will induce a property to be actual afterwards and similarly we can look back at the causes for actuality. A representation theorem for deterministic evolutions, explicitly for OQL-quantum systems under the name of Schrödinger flows, is given in Faure et al (1995) .
Only recently have these ideas been further elaborated under the name of dynamic OQL , to cover also the indeterministic cases. The basic concept is the notion of induction as defined in Amira et al (1998) -see also Coecke et al (2001) and Smets (2001) :
• An induction e ∈ ǫ s is a physical procedure that can be effectuated on a particular physical system s. This procedure, when carried out, might change s, modify the collection of its actual properties and thus its state, or even destroy s.
On the collection ǫ s of all inductions performable on a physical system s we can consider two operations, one corresponding to the arbitrary choice of inductions and one corresponding to a finite concatenation of inductions. Following Amira et al (1998) and Coecke et al (2001) , the finite concatenation of inductions e 1 , e 2 , ..., e n ∈ ǫ s is the induction e 1 &e 2 &...&e n which consists of first performing e 1 then e 2 , then ... until e n . The arbitrary choice of inductions in {e i | i ∈ I} ⊆ ǫ s is the induction i e i consisting of performing one of the e i , chosen in any possible way. 3 Defined as such, an act of induction can for example be the assurance of a free evolution (Faure et al 1995), indeterministic evolution (Coecke and Stubbe 1999), e.g., a measurement (Coecke and Smets 2000), or the action of one subsystem in a compound system on another one (Coecke 2000) . For reasons of formal simplicity we will only focus on inductions which cannot lead to the destruction of the physical system under consideration. 4 As such we presume that an induction cannot alter the nature of a physical system, whereby we mean that what can happen is that a system's state is shifted within the given initial state space, i.e., that the actuality and potentiality of the properties in the initial property lattice is changed. This implies that the description of a physical system by means of its state space or property lattice encompasses those states in which the system may be after performing an induction. More explicitly, we can point to the particular type of properties which are actual or potential before the system is altered and which contain information about the actuality or potentiality of particular properties after the system is altered. We introduce this particular type of properties formally (Coecke et al 2001) :
where the reason for reversal of the lattice order (this is what " op " in L op stands for) will be discussed below. The property e.a stands for "guaranteeing the actuality of a". Existence of a property e.a is indeed operationally assured in the following way: given that a corresponds to α , e.a corresponds to a definite experimental project "e.α" of the form "first execute the induction e and then perform the definite experimental project α , and, attribute the outcome of α to e.α" ( "e.a is an actual property for a system in a certain realization if it is sure that a would be an actual property of the system should we perform induction e ."
This explains that if e.a is actual it indeed "guarantees" the actuality of a with respect to e, while if e.a is potential it does not. This expression crystallizes into the idea of introducing a causal relation:
where subscript 1 points to the lattice before e and 2 to the lattice after e , as follows (Coecke et al 2001) :
• a e ; b := the actuality of a before e induces the actuality of b after e.
Against the background of our characterization of e.a we now see that e.a e ; a will always be valid and that 
2) Property Propagation:
Given those mappings, clearlyē * (a 2 ) is the weakest property whose actuality guarantees the actuality of a 2 andē * (a 1 ) is the strongest property whose actuality is induced by that of a 1 . Further we immediately obtain the Galois adjunction 6ē * (ē * (a 2 )) ≤ a 2 and a 1 ≤ē * (ē * (a 1 )) , denoted asē * ⊣ē * , since
In Coecke et al (2001) this adjunction is referred to as "causal duality", since it expresses the dual expressability of dynamic behavior for physical systems respectively in terms of propagation of properties and causal assignment.
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We also recall here that this argument towards causal duality suffices to establish evolution for quantum systems, i.e., systems with the lattice of closed subspaces of a Hilbert space as property lattice, in terms of linear or anti-linear maps (Faure et al 1995) and compoundness in terms of the tensor product of the corresponding Hilbert spaces (Coecke 2000) . It also follows from the above that the action defined in eq.(1) defines a quantale module action (Coecke et al 2001) -quantales will be discussed below. Crucial here is the fact that ( i e i ) · α and Π i (e i · α) clearly define the same property ( i e i ) · a = i (e i · a) , since both Π for definite experimental projects and for inductions express choice. Accordingly, the opposite ordering in eq.(1) then matches L-meets with ǫ-joins.
In the above we discussed the strongest propertyē * (a 1 ) of which actuality is induced by an induction due to actuality of a 1 , but only for maximally deterministic evolutions this fully describes the system's behavior. In other cases it makes sense to consider how (true logical) disjunctions of properties propagate, as such allowing accurate representation of for example the emergence of disjunction in a perfect quantum measurement (Coecke (nd)a, Coecke and Smets 2000, Smets 2001) due to the uncertainty on the measurement outcome whenever the system is not in an eigenstate of this measurement.
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First we introduce the notion of an actuality set as a set of properties of which at least one element is actual, clearly encoding logical disjunction in terms of actuality. As before we want to express propagation and causal assignment of these actuality sets. While we shift from the level of properties to sets of properties, we will have to take care that we don't loose particular information on the structure of L , in particular its operationally derived order. The solution to this problem consists in considering a certain kind of ideal. More specifically we work with the set DI(L) ⊆ P (L) , P (L) being the powerset of L , of which the elements are called property sets and which formally are the so-called distributive ideals of L , introduced in a purely mathematical setting in Bruns and Lakser (1970) :
• A distributive ideal is an order ideal, i.e. if a ≤ b ∈ I then a ∈ I and I = ∅, and is closed under distributive joins, i.e. if
Intuitively, this choice can be motivated as follows (a much more rigid argumentation does exists): 9 i. a first choice for encoding disjunctions would be the powerset itself, however, if a ≤ b we don't have {a} ⊆ {b} so we do not preserve order; otherwise stated, if a < b then the "propositions" {a} and {a, b} (read: either a or b is actual) mean the same thing, since actuality of b is implied by that of a ; ii. we can clearly overcome this problem by considering order ideals I(L) := {↓ [A]|A ⊆ L} ⊂ P (L) ; however, in case the property lattice would be a complete Heyting algebra in which all joins encode disjunctions, then A and { A} again mean the same thing; this redundancy is then exactly eliminated by considering distributive ideals (Coecke nd(a)) . For L atomistic and Σ ⊆ L , DI(L) ∼ = P (Σ) which implies that DI(L) is a complete atomistic boolean algebra (Coecke (nd)a) .
Similarly as for properties, for property sets we can operationally motivate the introduction of a causal relation
• A e ; B := if property set A is an actuality set before e , A induces that property set B is an actuality set after e .
To every induction we associate a map called property set causation and a map called property set propagation:
Similar as above we obtain an adjunctionê * ⊣ê * following from:
In case the induction e stands for "freeze" we obtain A e ; B = A ⊆ B. Note that the join preservation that follows from the adjunctionê * ⊣ê * expresses the physically obvious preservation of disjunction for temporal processes.
It is however also important to stress here that not all mapsê * : DI(L) 1 → DI(L) 2 are physically meaningful. Indeed, any physical induction admits mutually adjoint mapsē * andē * with the significance discussed above, the existence of such a mapē * : L 1 → L 2 forcingê * to satisfy a join continuity condition (Coecke and Stubbe 1999, Coecke et al 2001, Coecke (nd)a), namely:
which indeed expresses well-definedness of a correspondingē * since given an actuality set A , the strongest property that is actual with certainty is A . It is exactly in the existence of a non-trivial condition as in eq.(2) that the non-classicality of quantum theory comes in. As such, both causal dualities, the one on the level of properties and the other on the level of property sets, provide a physical law on transitions, respectively condition eq.(2) and preservation of DI(L)-joins. We also want to stress a manifest difference here with the setting in van Benthem (1994) :
"The most general model of dynamics is simply this: some system moves through a space of possibilities. Thus there is to be some set [ Thus it seems to us that the author aims to cover our study of dynamic behavior of physical systems. He moreover states (van Benthem 1994) :
"The main claim of this paper is that the above systems of relational algebra and dynamic logic provide a convenient architecture for bringing out essential logical features of action and cognition." (p.130)
We claim here that relational structures are inappropriate for modeling physical dynamics, even classically ! Let us motivate this claim. It follows from the above that transitions of properties of physical systems are internally structured by the causal duality, which in the particular case of non-classical systems restricts possible transitions. Recalling that for atomistic property lattices we have P (Σ) ∼ = DI(L) it is definitely true that any join preserving mapê * : DI(L) 1 → DI(L) 2 defines a unique relation R e ⊆ Σ 1 × Σ 2 , and conversely, any relation R ⊆ Σ 1 × Σ 2 defines a unique (join preserving) map
and this inverse plays a major role in van Benthem (1991, 1994) as converse action . However, nothing assures that whenê * satisfies eq.(2) that the map f R −1 e : DI(L) 2 → DI(L) 1 encoding the relational inverse satisfies eq. (2) , and as such, has any physical significance at all. 10 Obviously, this argument applies only to non-classical systems. More generally, however, since it is the duality between causation and propagation at the DI(L)-level that guarantees preservation of disjunction we feel that it should be present in any modelization, and although relations and union preserving maps between powersets are in bijective correspondence, they have fundamentally different dual realizations: relations have inverses, and union preserving maps between powersets have adjoints, and these two do not correspond at all, respectively being encoded as (in terms of maps between powersets):
if it was even only by the fact that one preserves unions and the other one intersections. As such, the seemingly innocent choice of representation in terms of relations or union preserving maps between powersets does have some manifest consequence in terms of the implemention of causal duality.
In the remaining part of this section we concentrate on the logic of actuality sets as initiated in Coecke (nd)a. Introduce the following primitive connectives:
While the first three connectives are standard in intuitionistic logic, R DI(L) should be conceived as a "resolution-connective" allowing us to recuperate the logical structure of properties on the level of property sets (Coecke (nd)a).
In particular, for classical systems we have R DI(L) = id DI(L) . Note that the condition in eq.(2) now becomes:
restricting the physically admissible transitions. Clearly, this condition is trivially satisfied for classical systems.
When concentrating on the material implication, we want to stress that on the level of L only for the properties in a distributive sublattice we can say the following:
This implication satisfies the strengthened law of entailment:
Note that in the non-distributive case for a
, which goes together with the fact that there are examples of orthomodular lattices for which a ′ ∨ b = 1 while a ≤ b. Hence in general, for T = {p ∈ Σ | p |= a ⇒ p |= b} there will not be an element x ∈ L for which µ(x) = T . There are of course examples of other implications which do satisfy the strengthened law of entailment in the orthomodular case -see for instance Kalmbach (1983) . It is now our aim to focus on the material implication for elements in DI(L). First we lift the Cartan map to the level of property sets µ(A) := µ[A] ⊆ Σ L , then we obtain the following semantical interpretation:
From this it follows that
which allows us to reformulate the given static implication → DI(L) as follows:
where C |= A ⇔ ∀p ∈ µ(C) : p ∈ µ(A). Again this implication satisfies the strengthened law of entailment in the sense that
and is as operation the right adjoint with respect to the conjunction DI(L) , as it is always the case for the implication connective of a complete Heyting algebra -see for example Borceux (1994) or Johnstone (1982) :
As for the static material implication defined above, we now want to look for a dynamic propagation-implication satisfying the following:
The candidate which naturally arises is (Coecke (nd)b):
or, equivalently:
In case e stands for the induction "freeze" we see that e → reduces to → DI(L) . Similar as in the static case, we can find an induction-labeled operation as left adjoint to the dynamic propagation-implication, i.e., It is important here to notice that this dynamic conjunction is a commutative operation. Sinceê * preserves joins and since in DI(L) binary meets distribute over arbitrary joins (being a complete Heyting algebra) we moreover have (Coecke (nd)b) :
{A ⊗ e B | B ∈ B} , so DI(L) is equipped with operations e → and ⊗ e , for every e ∈ ǫ s the latter yielding "commutative quantales". Let us give the definition of a quantale (Rosenthal 1990 (Rosenthal , 1996 , Paseka and Rosicky 2000) :
• A quantale is a complete lattice Q together with an associative binary operation
Thus, for each induction e we obtain that (DI(L), DI(L) , ⊗ e ) is a commutative quantale since ⊗ e is a commutative operation. In case e stands for "freeze", the mentioned quantale becomes a locale (DI(L), DI(L) , ∧ DI(L) ) , i.e., a complete Heyting algebra. Recall here that a locale is a quantale with as quantale product the meet-operation of the complete lattice, and one verifies that this definition exactly coincides with that of a complete Heyting algebra -for details we refer again to Borceux (1994) or Johnstone (1982) .
As for the propagation-implications which, when valid, express a forward causal relation between property sets, we can introduce causationimplications. The relation to which these causation-implications match will be a backward relation introduced as follows:
• A e B := If property set B is an actuality set after e then property set A was an actuality set before e . The causation-implications we want to work with now have to satisfy:
The candidate which satisfies this condition is:
As such we see that when A e ← B is valid (i.e. equal to L) then it expresses that if property set B is an actuality set after e then property set A was an actuality set before e. Again we have a left adjoint for the causationimplication:
(− e ⊗B) ⊣ (− e ← B) with A e ⊗B := A
DI(L)ê * (B) .
Thus we can additionally equip DI(L) with e ← and e ⊗ , for each e ∈ ǫ s the latter yielding non-commutative co-quantales (DI(L) , DI(L) , e ⊗) , i.e., with a distributive property with respect to meets. Note that the preservation of joins for propagation versus that of meets for causation reflects here in a two-sided distributivity respectively with respect to joins and meets. Indeed, since we have:
this distributivity truly encodes the respective join and meet preservation and consequently, also the causal duality.
It is important to remark that the semantics we obtain is the complete Heyting algebra of actuality sets DI(L) equipped with additional dynamic connectives to express causation and propagation: It turns out that we have a forward negation ¬ which does not depend on e , and thus coincides with that of "freeze", i.e., the static one, and a backward negation e ¬ which by contrast does depend on e -for a discussion of these negations we refer to Coecke ((nd)b), Coecke et al ((nd)c) and Smets (2001) . Note here that DI(L) is also a left quantale module forǫ = {ê | e ∈ ǫ s } when considering the pointwise action of (e.−) . This then intertwines the two quantale structures that emerge in our setting. We end this section by mentioning that it is possible to implement other kinds of implications on DI(L) that extend the causal relation. As an example, in Coecke et al ((nd)c) we show that it is possible to extend DI(L) with bi-labeled families of non-commutative quantales rendering bi-labeled implications, some of them extending the ones presented in this paper.
COMPARISON WITH LINEAR LOGIC
We will analyze another logic of dynamics, namely linear logic, while focusing on the differences with dynamic OQL especially with respect to the quantale structures mentioned above. We intend to give a brief overview of the analysis presented in Smets (2001) of the basic ideas behind "Linear logic" as introduced in Girard (1987 Girard ( , 1989 ) .
The main advantage linear logic has with respect to classical/intuitionistic logic is that it allows us to deal with actions versus situations in the sense of stable truths (Girard 1989 ). This should be understood in the sense that linear logic is often called a resource sensitive logic. The linear logical formulas can be conceived as expressing finite resources, the classical formulas then being interpretable as corresponding to unlimited or eternal resources. Allowing ourselves to be a bit more formal on this matter, resource sensitivity is linked to the explicit control of the weakening and contraction rules. As structural rules, weakening and contraction will be discarded in the general linear logical framework. Note that in non-commutative linear logic, to which we will come back later, the exchange-rule will also be dropped. We use A, B for sequences of well formed formulas and a, b for well formed formulas. Sequents are conceived as usual: Dropping weakening and contraction implies that linear formulas cannot be duplicated or contracted at random, in other words, our resources are restricted. An important consequence of dropping these two structural rules is the existence of two kinds of "disjunctions" and "conjunctions". 11 We will obtain a so-called additive disjunction ⊕ and additive conjunction ⊓ and a so-called multiplicative disjunction ℘ and multiplicative conjunction ⊗. The following left and right rules will make their differences clear. (⊗ R)
By allowing the structural rules and by using (⊗) we can express the (⊓)-rules and vice versa. A similar result can be obtained for the (⊕) and (℘)-rules, for more details we refer to for instance Smets (2001) .
To understand linear logic, it is necessary to take a look at the intuitive meaning of the above additives and multiplicatives derived from their use by the above rules. First it is important to note that to obtain ⊗ in a conclusion, no sharing of resources is allowed, while the contrary is the case for ⊓. Similarly, there is a difference between ℘ and ⊕. In the line of thought exposed in Girard (1989) , the meanings to be attached to the connectives are the following:
• a ⊗ b means that both resources, a and b are given simultaneously ;
• a ⊓ b means that one may choose between a and b ;
• a ⊕ b means that one of both resources, a or b, is given though we have lack of knowledge concerning the exact one ;
• a℘b expresses a constructive disjunction.
The meaning of ℘ becomes clearer when we follow J.Y. Girard in his construction that every atomic formula of his linear logical language has by definition a negation (−) ⊥ . Running a bit ahead of our story, the meaning of a℘b will now come down to the situation where "if" not a is given "then" b is given and "if" not b is given "then" a is given. Of course this explanation is linked to the commutative case where a linear logical implication is defined as a ⊥ ℘b := a ⊸ b which by transposition equals b ⊥ ⊸ a ⊥ . In the same sense, only in the commutative case where a ⊗ b equals b ⊗ a, does it make sense to say that a ⊗ b comes down to simultaneous given resources.
We will be more specific on the linear logical implication and analyze the underlying philosophical ideas as presented in Girard (1989) where of course ⊸ is defined by means of ℘. What is important is that the linear implication should mimic exactly what happens when a non-iteratable action is being performed, where we conceive of a non-iteratable action to be such that after its performance the initial resources are not available any more as initial resources. The linear implication should as such express the consumption of initial resources and simultaneously the production of final resources. Indeed, as stated in Girard (1995) , the linear implication ⊸ expresses a form of causality: a ⊸ b is to be conceived as "from a get b". More explicitly (Girard 1989 ) :
"A causal implication cannot be iterated since the conditions are modified after its use; this process of modification of the premises (conditions) is known in physics as reaction." (p.72) or in Girard (2000) : "C'est donc une vision causale de la déduction logique, qui s'opposè a la pérennité de la vérité traditionelle en philosophie et en mathé-matiques. On a ici des vérités fugaces, contingentes, dominées par l'idée de ressource et d'action." (p.532) If we understand this correctly, the act of consumption and production is called a non-iteratable action while the process of modification of initial conditions, the deprivation of resources, is called reaction. The idea of relating action and reaction is in a sense metaphorically based on Newton's actionreaction principle in physics. Girard uses this metaphor also when he explains why every formula has by definition a linear negation which expresses a duality or change of standpoint (Girard 1989 "Concrètement la négation correspondà la dualité "action/réaction" et pas du toutà l'idée de ne pas effectuer une action: typiquement lire/écrire, envoyer/recevoir, sont justicibles de la négation linéaire." (p.532)
In Girard (1989) the notion of a reaction of type A ⊥ , as dual to an action of type A, is quite mysterious and not further elaborated. The only thing Girard mentions is that it should come down to an "inversion of causality, i.e. of the sense of time" (Girard 1989 
Thus we tend to agree with Girard (1989) where he says that this discussion involves not standard but non-commutative linear logic. Indeed, against the background of the causation-propagation duality elaborated upon above, if Girard has something similar to causation in mind, we know that what is necessary is an implication and "non-commutative" conjunction which allow us to express causation. As we will show further on, switching from standard to noncommutative linear logic effects the meanings of the linear implication and linear negation.
Leaving this action-reaction debate aside, we can now explain why our given interpretation of non-iterability is quite subtle. First note that in Girard's standard linear logic, ⊢ a ⊸ a is provable from an empty set of premises. As such ⊸ represents in a ⊸ a the identity-action which does not really change resources, but only translates initial ones into final ones. And although we could perform the action twice in the following sense: a 1 ⊸ a 2 ⊸ a 3 -for convenience we labeled the resources -this still does not count as an iteratable action since a 1 is to be conceived as an initial resource, different from a 2 , the final resource of the first action. But we can go further in this discussion and follow Girard in stipulating the fact that we may still encounter situations in which the picture of "consuming all initial resources" does not hold. Linear logic henceforth allows also the expression of those actions which deal with stable situations and which are iteratable. In the latter case the use of exponentials is necessary where for instance the exponential ! gives !a the meaning that a's use as a resource is unlimited.
In Girard (1989) , Girard reveals the link between states, transitions and the linear implication. In particular, for us it is the following statement which places the linear implication in an interesting context, thinking of course about the above discussed dynamic OQL, (Girard 1989 ):
"In fact, we would like to represent states by formulas, and transitions by means of implications of states, in such a way that the state S ′ is accessible from S exactly when S ⊸ S ′ is provable from the transitions, taken as axioms." (p.74)
In Girard (1989) this statement applies to for instance systems such as Petri nets, Turing machines, chessboard games, etc. Focusing "in this sense" on physical systems, and using ⊸ for transitions of states, it becomes interesting to investigate how ⊸ can be conceived in the context of our logic of actuality sets. While a formal comparison on the semantical level will be given in the next paragraph we have to stress here that there is on the methodological level the following point of difference between dynamic OQL and linear logic: contrary to dynamic OQL, it should be well understood that linear logic is not a temporal logic, no preconceptions of time or processes is built into it. More explicitly (Girard 1989 ):
"Linear logic is eventually about time, space and communication, but is not a temporal logic, or a kind of parallel language: such approaches try to develop preexisting conceptions about time, processes, etc. In those matters, the general understanding is so low that one has good chances to produce systems whose aim is to avoid the study of their objects [...] The main methodological commitment is to refuse any a priori intuition about these objects of study, and to assume that (at least part of) the temporal, the parallel features of computation are already in Gentzen's approach, but are simply hidden by taxonomy." (p.104)
As such dynamic OQL started out with a different methodology. The objects of study are well-known "scientific objects" such as physical systems and their properties and the inductions performable on physical systems. In a sense this information has been encrypted in the formulas we used. All dynamic propagation-and causation-implications have been labeled by inductions, and this is different from the linear logical implications which are used to express any (non-specified) transition. In view of quantum theory it is indeed the case that one cannot speak about observed quantities without specification of the particular measurement one performs, and as such, the corresponding induction that encodes von Neumann's projection postulate. Exactly this forms quite an argument against applying the linear logical implications in a context of physical processes. Thus, we are not tempted to agree with the proposal in Pratt (1993) of adding linear logical connectives as an extension to quantum logic, but rather focus on the development of a new logical syntax which will however have some definite similarities with linear logic, in particular with its quantale semantical fragment.
In order to get a grasp on the quantale semantics of linear logic we have to say something about its non-commutative variants. In the literature on non-commutative linear logic, two main directions emerge. In a first direction one introduces non-commutativity of the multiplicatives by restricting the exchange-rule to circular permutations while in a second direction one completely drops all structural rules. Concentrating on the first direction, here linear logic with a cyclic exchange rule is called cyclic linear logic and has mainly been developed by D.N Yetter in Yetter (1990), though we have to note that Girard already makes some remarks on cyclic exchanges in Girard (1989) . More explicitly we see that the restriction to cyclic permutations means that we consider the sequents as written on a circle (Girard 1989 ) . This then should come down to the fact that a 1 ⊗ ... ⊗ a n−1 ⊗ a n ⊢ a n ⊗ a 1 ⊗ ... ⊗ a n−1 is provable in cyclic linear logic. Of course the meaning of ⊗ with respect to the standard case changes in the sense that it expresses now "and then" (Yetter 1990 ) or when following Girard (1989) it means that "in the product b ⊗ a, the second component is done before the first one". As we will explain in the next paragraph on Girard quantales, it is exactly the difference between − ⊗ a and a ⊗ − which leads to the introduction of two different implication-connectives in cyclic linear logic: ⊸ and •−.
Given a unital quantale (Q, , ⊗), with 1 as the multiplicative neutral element with respect to ⊗ , it then follows that the endomorphisms a ⊗ −, − ⊗ a : Q → Q have right adjoints, a ⊸ − and − •−a respectively:
We know that in the standard linear logic as presented by Girard, the fol-
In cyclic linear logic where we have now two implications, things change in the sense that we obtain:
To be more explicit, the linear negation can be interpreted in the unital quantale (Q, , ⊗, 1) by means of a cyclic dualizing element, which can be defined as follows (Rosenthal 1990 , Yetter 1990 ) :
Here the operation − ⊸⊥ or equivalently ⊥ •−− is called the linear negation and can be written as (−) ⊥ . Note that a unital quantale with a cyclic dualizing element ⊥ is called a Girard quantale , a notion having been introduced in Yetter (1990) . These Girard quantales can be equipped with modal operators to interpret the linear logical exponentials and form as such a straightforward semantics for the cyclic as well as standard linear logical syntax. In the latter case a ⊸ b = b •−a. The disadvantage suffered by cyclic linear logic is that it is still not "non-commutative enough to properly express time's arrow" (Yetter 1990 ). Indeed, if ⊸ is to be conceived as a causal implication then it would have been nice to conceive •− as expressing past causality, though this interpretation is too misleading according to (Girard 1989) . In a way we agree with him since in cyclic linear logic a ⊸ b and a ⊥ •−b ⊥ are the same -in the sense that they are both equal to a ⊥ ℘b.
Focusing on the second direction in the non-commutative linear logical literature, we first have to mention the work of J. Lambek. Lambek's syntactic calculus originated in Lambek (1958) and as Girard admits, is the noncommutative ancestor of linear logic. However it has to be mentioned that Lambek's syntactic calculus, as originally developed against a linguistic background, is essentially multiplicative and intuitionistic. Later on Lambek extended his syntactic calculus with additives and recently renamed his formal calculus bilinear logic. In the same direction we can place the work of V.M. Abrusci who developed a non-commutative version of the intuitionistic linear propositional logic in Abrusci (1990) and of the classical linear propositional logic in Abrusci (1991) . Specific to Abrusci's work, however, is the fact that a full removal of the exchange rule requires the introduction of two different negations and two different implications. To explain this in detail we switch to the semantical level of quantales; where we want to note that Abrusci works in Abrusci (1990 Abrusci ( , 1991 with the more specific structure of phase spaces which as proved in Rosenthal (1990) Let us finish of this paragraph with a note on the fact that there is of course much more to say about (non)-commutative linear logic, especially since research on it is now in full development and expansion, though we feel that our overview suffices for our needs.
Given the above expositions, it follows that (DI(L), DI(L) , ⊗ e ) , the quantale fragment emerging for propagation for a specific induction e , provides an example of the quantale obtained for commutative linear logic. Note that the difference of course lies in the fact that in commutative linear logic no retro-implication different from ⊸ is present, not even as an additional structure. In this respect, to obtain a retro-implication in linear logic it is necessary to move to a non-commutative linear logic providing a single quantale in which to interpret ⊸ and •− , in sharp contrast to our constructions allowing the interpretation of e → and e ← for each specific e . Finally, let us note that while the implication ⊸, when focusing on it as an implication expressing simultaneous consumption of initial resources and production of final resources, is much stronger than e →, it can nevertheless be reconstructed within the framework of dynamic OQL (Smets 2001).
CONCLUSION
It seems to us that an actual attitude towards the logic of dynamics ought to be pluralistic, as it follows from our two main paradigmatic examples, dynamic operational quantum logic and Girard's linear logic. The mentioned attempts that aim to integrate the logic of dynamics as it emerges from for example physical and proof theoretic considerations fail either on formal grounds or due to conceptual inconsistency. We indeed provided a nonclassical physical counterexample to van Benthem's general dynamic logic, and argued that even for classical systems, from a physical perspective adjoints rather than relational inverses should be the formal bases for the logic of dynamics.
NOTES
1. From now on OQL will only refer to Geneva School operational quantum logic. 2. It is exactly the particular operational foundation of ontological concepts that has caused a lot of confusion with respect to this approach, including some attacks on it due to misunderstandings stemming from identification of "what is", "what is observed", "what will be observed", "what would be observed", "what could be observed", etc. We don't refer to these papers but cite one that refutes them in a more than convincing way, namely Foulis and Randall (1984) . We recall here that it were D.J. Foulis and C.H. Randall who developed an empirical counterpart to C. Piron's ontological approach (Foulis and Randall 1972 , Foulis et al 1983 , Randall and Foulis 1983 . We also quote the review of R. Piziak in Mathematical Reviews of one of these attacks of Piron's approach exposing their somewhat doubtful aims (MR86i:81012):
"... in fact, they confused the very essence of Piron's system of questions and propositions, the sharp distinction between properties of a physical system and operationally testable propositions about the system. [...] In their reply to Foulis and Randall, HT ignore the list of mathematical errors, confusions and blunders in their papers except for one (a minor one at that). HT simply reissue their challenge and dismiss the work of Foulis and Randall as well as Piron as being "useless from the physicist's point of view". However, when one finds an argument in HTM (the main theorem of their 1981 paper) to the effect that the failure to prove the negation of a theorem constitutes a proof of the theorem, one might form a different opinion as to whose work is 'useless'. It is right and proper for any scientific work to be scrutinized and criticized according to its merits. Indeed, this is a main impetus to progress. But if mathematics is to be used as a tool of criticism, let it be used properly."
See also Smets (2001) for an overview of most of the criticism and its refutal on OQL. We refer to Coecke (nd)b for a formulation of OQL where a conceptually somewhat less rigid, but more general perspective is proposed, avoiding the notion of test or definite experimental project in the definition of a physical property as an ontological quality of a system. One of the motivations for this reformulation is exactly the confusion that the current formulation seems to cause -although there is definitely nothing wrong with it as the truly careful reader knows, on the contrary in fact. if and only if ∀a ∈ M : f * (f * (a)) ≤ a and ∀a ∈ L : a ≤ f * (f * (a)) . One could somewhat abusively say that Galois adjointness generalizes the notion of inverse maps to non-isomorphic objects: in the case that f * and f * are inverse, and thus L and M isomorphic, the above inequalities saturate in equalities. Whenever f * ⊣ f * , f * preserves all existing joins and f * all existing meets. This means that for a Galois adjoint pair between complete lattices, one of these maps preserves all meets and the other preserves all joins. Conversely, for L and M complete lattices, any meet preserving map f * : M → L has a unique join preserving left Galois adjoint f * : a → {b ∈ M |a ≤ f * (b)} and any join preserving map f * : L → M a unique meet preserving right adjoint f * : b → {a ∈ L|f * (a) ≤ b} . 7. This dual representation then includes in the duality between the categories Inf of complete lattices and meet-preserving maps and Sup of complete lattices and join preserving maps, since this duality is exactly established in terms of Galois adjunction at the morphism level -see Coecke et al (2001) for details. 8. See also Amira et al (1998) and Coecke and Stubbe (1999) for a similar development in terms of a so-called operational resolution on the state set. 9. Let us briefly describe the more rigid argumentation. Consider the following definitions for A ⊆ L : i. A is called disjunctive iff ( A actual ⇔ ∃a ∈ A : a actual) ; ii. Superposition states for A are states for which A is actual while no a ∈ A is actual ; iii. Superposition properties for A are properties c < A whose actuality doesn't imply that at least one a ∈ A is actual. We then have that ( A disjunctive ⇔ A distributive) provided that existence of superposition states implies existence of superposition properties (Coecke (nd)a) . Moreover, a complete lattice L has the complete Heyting algebra DI(L) of distributive ideals as its distributive hull (Bruns and Lakser 1970) , providing it with a universal property . The inclusion preserves all meets and existing distributive joins. Thus, DI(L) encodes all possible disjunctions of properties, and moreover, it turns out that all DI(L)-meets are conjunctive and all DI(L)-joins are disjunctive -note that this is definitely not the case in the powerset P (L) of a property lattice, nor in the order ideals I(L) ordered by inclusion . It follows from this that the object equivalence between: i. complete lattices, and, ii. complete Heyting algebras equipped with a distributive closure (i.e., it preserves distributive sets), encodes an intuitionistic representation for OQL -see Coecke ((nd)a) for details. 10. The following mapê * : P (Σ) 1 → P (Σ) 2 provides a counterexample: Let Σ 1 = Σ 2 := {p, q, r, s} with as closed subsets {∅, {p}, {q}, {r}, {s}, {q, r, s}, Σ} ⊂ P (Σ) 1 = P (Σ) 2 , and setê * ({p}) → {p, q} ,ê * ({q}) → {q} ,ê * ({r}) → {r} ,ê * ({s}) → {s} ; one verifies that although {q, r} = {r, s} we have f R −1 e ({q, r}) = {p, q, r} = {r, s} = f R −1 e ({r, s}) since {p, q, r} yields the top element of the property lattice and {r, s} doesn't . 11. Note here that in accordance to the literature on linear logic, contra section 2 and section 3 of this paper, we do use the terms conjunction and disjunction beyond their strict intuitionistic significance. This however should not cause any confusion.
